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Functions of a Market
Markets (electronic or otherwise) have three main
functions, summarized in Table 1: matching buy-
ers and sellers; facilitating the exchange of infor-
mation, goods, services and payments associated
with market transactions; and providing an insti-
tutional infrastructure, such as a legal and regula-
tory framework, that enables the efficient
functioning of the market.  
In a modern economy, the first two functions
are provided by intermediaries, while the institu-
tional infrastructure is typically the province of
governments. Internet-based electronic market-
places leverage information technology to perform
these functions with increased effectiveness and
reduced transaction costs, resulting in more effi-
cient, “friction-free” markets.
Matching Buyers and Sellers. Markets “clear”
by matching demand and supply. This process of
matching buyers’ demand with sellers’ product
offerings has three main components: determining
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Table 1. Functions of a market 
I n t e r n e t  E c o n o m i c s
Matching buyers and sellers
•   Determination of product offerings
    -  Product features offered by sellers
    -  Aggregation of different products
•   Search (of buyers for sellers and of sellers for buyers)
    -  Price and product information
    -  Matching seller offerings with buyer preferences
•   Price discovery
    -  Process and outcome in determination of prices
Facilitation of transactions
•   Logistics
    -  Delivery of information, good, or service to buyer
•   Settlement
    -  Transfer of payment to seller
•   Trust
    -  Credit system, reputations, rating agencies like Consumer
       Reports and Better Business Bureaus
Institutional infrastucture
•   Legal
    -  Commercial code, contract law, dispute resolution,
       intellectual property protection
•   Regulatory
    -  Rules and regulations, monitoring, enforcement
product offerings, search, and price discovery. The behav-
ior of buyers, sellers, and intermediaries is motivated
by their desire to maximize their private utility.
When markets function well, this also leads to an
efficient allocation of productive resources. Viewed
this way, markets are the engine and steering system
of our economy.
Markets provide sellers with information about
demand that allows them to employ economic inputs
such as capital, technology and labor, and develop
products with characteristics that match the needs of
buyers. Sellers determine a schedule of product offer-
ings that they expect will maximize their profits
based on:
• information about buyer demand;
• the cost of inputs;
• the available technology for production and dis-
tribution of the information, goods and services
purchased by the buyers; and,
• the transaction costs of administering production,
distribution, and payment.  
Buyers select their purchases from the available
product offerings after considering factors such as
price and product characteristics. In obtaining and
processing this information, buyers face search costs.
These costs include the opportunity cost of time spent
searching, as well as associated expenditures such as
driving, telephone calls, computer fees, magazine sub-
scriptions, etc. Typically, sellers exploit these search
costs by raising their prices, and thus enjoy higher
profits. Similarly sellers may face search costs in locat-
ing qualified buyers for their products, such as market
research, advertising and sales calls.
A key function of markets in our economic system
is price discovery, which is the process of determining
the prices at which demand and supply “clear” and
trade occurs. For certain markets, such as financial
markets, this is their primary function.  Markets can
employ a number of mechanisms for price discovery.
For instance, some financial markets use one or more
of the several types of auctions to determine prices,
such as the “call market” auction at the opening of a
trading day at the New York Stock Exchange, when
bids are accepted up to a certain time and exchange
occurs when the market opens. This is the first price
that is communicated via the stock market ticker to
the market at large, kicking off a day of “continuous
market” trading. Other markets, such as the tradi-
tional automobile dealership, employ negotiation
between buyers and sellers until a price is reached. In
still other markets, such as the typical department
store, merchants make firm offers that customers can
either take or leave.
Facilitation of Transactions. The matching func-
tion of a market establishes a bilateral relationship
between a buyer and a seller. After a transaction is
agreed upon, the product sold must be transported to
the buyer (logistics), and payment must be transferred
to the seller (settlement). Markets typically incorpo-
rate mechanisms for logistics and settlement: when a
travel agent uses an airline reservations system to
book a flight, the system will generate the itinerary
and the ticket, and will process a credit card payment.
Furthermore, market transactions require the estab-
lishment of a certain level of trust, which protects
buyers, sellers and intermediaries from the oppor-
tunistic behavior of other market participants.  For
instance, this trust role may include banks issuing let-
ters of credit, credit reporting bureaus, or rating agen-
cies such as Consumer Reports and Better Business
Bureaus, which keep track of product information and
seller reputations, and thus discourage opportunistic
behavior. Finally, markets provide the physical infra-
structure that allows transactions between the buyers
and the sellers to take place.  This includes real assets
such as physical structures and trading floors, com-
puters and communication networks, and transporta-
tion systems.
Institutional Infrastructure. The institutional
infrastructure specifies the laws, rules and regulations
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Establishing a dialogue and a sense of community among 
customers can create value by enabling the sharing of experiences, 
problems and solutions, but also allows the collection of 
important information about individual consumers.  
that govern market transactions, such as issues related
to contract law, dispute resolution, and intellectual
property protection, and provides mechanisms for
their enforcement. In addition, the dynamics of elec-
tronic markets may raise certain antitrust issues. For
example, there are large economies of scale in distrib-
ution, as a single online retailer or intermediary can
serve a very large market. There are also potential
demand-side economies of scale in payment mecha-
nisms and software. These may lead to a winner-take-
all market structure [1] with one or a few firms
dominating the market.
How the Internet Affects Markets
Electronic marketplaces, especially Internet-based
markets, are having a major impact on the roles of
markets discussed previously [2, 12]. 
Product Offerings. Two major emerging trends
distinguish products in electronic marketplaces from
their traditional counterparts: increased personalization
and customization of product offerings, and the aggregation
and disaggregation of information-based product components
to match customer needs and to support new pricing
strategies.
Electronic marketplaces support personalization
and customization in two ways:
• Consumer tracking technology allows the identi-
fication of individual buyers; information about
these buyers, such as relevant demographics, con-
sumer profiles, or comparison with the known
preferences of similar consumers, can be used to
discover or estimate their specific preferences.
• Information-rich products lend themselves to
cost-effective customization; for instance, deliver-
ing an electronic newspaper tailored to the inter-
ests of an individual reader need not be more
costly than delivering the same copy to all 
subscribers.
Current personalization and customization technolo-
gies use either rule-based systems like Broadvision
(www.broadvision.com) that draw upon sets of
expert rules, or collaborative filtering systems like
the Firefly Network (www.firefly.net) that utilize the
feedback and experiences of consumers with a profile
of likes and dislikes similar to the targeted buyer.  
This allows the practice of “one-to-one market-
ing,” which is based on understanding individual
consumers. For instance, establishing a dialogue and
a sense of community among customers can create
value by enabling the sharing of experiences, prob-
lems and solutions, but also allows the collection of
important information about individual consumers.
The ultimate objective is to provide customized ser-
vices according to individual preferences, whether
expressed or inferred. Increased selling effectiveness
comes from being able to design appropriate prod-
ucts to address the needs of individual consumers,
and from being able to identify the moment when a
customer’s purchasing decision is most likely to
occur and to be prepared for that moment, one step
ahead of the competition.  
When determining their product mix, sellers
must decide which product components or features
will be included in each product offering. For exam-
ple, the developer of an operating system must
decide which features to implement, and whether
they will be marketed and priced individually or in
a single bundle. These decisions are driven by the
relative cost of different product bundles, which
includes the following types of costs:
• Production cost: the cost of producing additional
units for inclusion in the bundle, including stor-
age, processing, and communications costs
incurred in the process.
• Transaction and distribution cost: the cost of dis-
tributing a bundle of goods and administering
the related transactions, such as arranging for
payment.
• Binding cost: the cost of binding the component
goods together for distribution as a bundle, such
as formatting changes necessary to include news
stories from wire services in a newspaper bundle.
• Menu cost: the cost of administering multiple
prices. If a mixed bundling strategy is pursued,
where the available components are offered in dif-
ferent combinations, then a set of n goods may
require as many as 2n prices (one for each subset
of one or more goods).
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• Purchasing a new home
  - Research city and neighborhood
  - Find a house
  - Inspections, title research, appraisals, contracts
  - Get a mortgage
  - Moving services
  - Decorators, furniture, etc.
• Planning a vacation
  - Research destination
  - Arrange accommodations and travel
  - Purchase maps, books, information
  - Check out weather, items to take
• Purchasing a car
  - Research make and model
  - Select a dealer
  - Get a loan or arrange a lease
  - Purchase insurance
Table 2. Components of consumer processes and 
transaction/distribution cost
Internet marketplaces are changing the constraints
imposed by these costs and thus are fostering new
types of intermediaries that create value by aggre-
gating services and products that traditionally were
offered by separate industries. For instance, Table 2
shows the components of three processes that gener-
ate value for consumers. In traditional markets, these
components are provided by separate industries. A
consumer in the market for a new car might select a
make and model based on the experience collected
from test drives, research from auto magazines and
Consumer Reports, and recommendations from friends.
She would then agree on price, order the vehicle, and
take delivery through a car dealer, arrange financing
through a bank, and purchase insurance from an
insurance company. By dramatically lowering the
transaction, distribution and binding costs, the
Internet has allowed intermediaries such as Auto-by-
Tel (www.auto-by-tel.com) or Microsoft’s Carpoint
(www.carpoint.com) to offer all of these products
and services, with the exception of an actual test
drive.
Similar intermediaries are emerging in other
areas, such as the Travelocity (www.travelocity.com)
and Microsoft’s Expedia (www.expedia.com) travel
services aggregators, or Microsoft’s Boardwalk Web
site that will aggregate products and services related
to real estate transactions.
The Case of Information Goods. Digital infor-
mation goods, such as news articles, digital images
or music, allow perfect copies to be created and dis-
tributed almost without cost via the Internet. The
Internet is thus precipitating a dramatic reduction
in the marginal costs of production and distribution
for these goods, while micropayment technologies
are reducing the transaction costs for their commer-
cial exchange. Bakos and Brynjolfsson [6] point out
that this creates new opportunities for repackaging
content through strategies such as bundling, site
licensing, subscriptions, rentals, differential pricing
and per-use fees. All of these schemes can be thought
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Figure 2. ComputerESP price comparison engine
of as either aggregating or disaggregating informa-
tion goods along some dimension. For instance,
aggregation can take place across products, as when
software programs are bundled for sale in a software
suite or when access to various content of an online
service is provided for a fixed fee. Aggregation can
also take place across consumers, as with the provi-
sion of a site license to multiple users for a fixed fee,
or over time, as with subscriptions. 
Many information goods have been bundled solely
to save on transaction, distribution and menu costs,
yet these costs are much lower on the Internet. Thus
software and other types of content may be increas-
ingly disaggregated and metered, as on-demand soft-
ware applets or as individual news stories and stock
quotes. Independent of the cost considerations men-
tioned previously, Bakos and Brynjolfsson [6] show
that aggregation of large numbers of information
goods can be a powerful strategy that results in
higher profits for sellers as well as a socially desirable
wider distribution of the goods. This is due to the
ability of aggregation to change the shape of the
demand curve faced by the sellers to one that is eas-
ier to exploit. 
Aggregation can be a surprisingly profitable strat-
egy when marginal production costs are low and con-
sumers are homogeneous. Bakos and Brynjolfsson’s
analysis provides a framework to understand the
emergence of intermediaries that aggregate online
content, such as America Online and Yahoo!, as well
as the increasing use of subscription pricing in the
sale of information goods by companies such as
Netscape, Dow-Jones, or Reuters. Figure 1 graphi-
cally summarizes this discussion and depicts the
impact of marginal cost c and distribution/transac-
tion cost d on the desirability of bundling large num-
bers of information goods.
Search. Electronic marketplaces lower the buyers’
cost to obtain information about the price and prod-
uct features of seller offerings as well as the sellers’ cost
to communicate information about their prices and
product characteristics. For instance, a buyer in the
market for a 400MHz Pentium II microprocessor can
easily compare the prices of different sellers by using a
specialized search engine like Pricewatch (www.price-
watch.com) or ComputerESP (www.computeresp.
com), as shown in Figure 2. Similarly, links to manu-
facturers’ Web sites can be used to obtain detailed
information about the product features of different
laptop computers. By lowering buyers’ search costs,
electronic markets increase economic efficiency. Not
only do buyers incur lower costs even after considering
more product offerings, they also benefit from being
able to identify and purchase products that better
match their needs.  
Several Internet-based technologies assist buyers’
searching: multimedia, high bandwidth, and rating
sites provide more product information. Search
engines help buyers identify appropriate seller offer-
ings. The search engines can be hierarchical directories
(like Yahoo!), generic tools (like AltaVista in early
1998), or specialized tools that work best in the con-
text of specific markets (such as Pricewatch and
ComputerESP for computers and peripherals, or
Expedia and Travelocity for airline tickets and other
travel products). Intelligent agents such as Bargain-
finder (bf.cstar.ac.com/bf) or Jango (www.jango.com)
have been developed to scout the Web and compare
product offerings by price or features on the behalf of
the buyers. These technologies keep lowering buyers’
search costs. The lower search costs enable new mar-
kets to emerge. For example, low buyer search costs
and global reach allowed Onsale.com
(www.onsale.com) to create markets in goods like
secondhand cameras; otherwise the search costs
would be too high to enable potential buyers and
sellers to find each other in a conventional market.
Several other intermediaries are emerging to facili-
tate the process of matching buyers and sellers.
Among many others they include Yahoo!, Price-
watch, Netbot’s Jango, and several other search
engines, Web directories and shopping agents. They
also include providers for product information (e.g.,
CNet, trade magazines), recommendations and per-
sonalization (e.g., Firefly Network), and information
about sellers such as Bizrate.
Price Discovery. Electronic marketplaces enable
new types of price discovery to be employed in dif-
ferent markets. For example, some airlines auction
last-minute unsold seats to the highest bidders, and
Web-based auctions at Onsale.com have created for
consumer goods markets that function like the finan-
cial markets. Intermediaries such as Priceline
(www.priceline.com) allow buyers to specify product
requirements and the amount they’re willing to pay,
and then make corresponding offers to the partici-
pating sellers, reversing the traditional functioning
of retail markets. Finally, agents such as Kasbah
(ecommerce.media.mit.edu/kasbah) and Tête-à-Tête
(ecommerce.media.mit.edu/tete-a-tete) that can
negotiate purchases on behalf of buyers and sellers,
may restructure the price discovery process in Inter-
net marketplaces [11].
The ability to customize products, combined with
the ability of sellers to access substantial information
about prospective buyers, such as demographics,
preferences and past shopping behavior, is greatly
improving sellers’ ability to price discriminate—that
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is, to charge different prices for different buyers.
Price discrimination is a powerful tool that allows
sellers to increase their profits, and reduces the con-
sumer surplus enjoyed by buyers. On the other hand,
price discrimination enables sellers to service buyers
who would otherwise be priced out of the market, an
outcome that increases economic efficiency.
These new types of price discovery, such as the
ability of buyers to make offers and the ability to
conduct electronic negotiations between buyer and
seller agents, are changing the “microstructure” of
consumer markets. Finance theory has shown that
market microstructure affects both the efficiency of
markets and the bargaining power of their partici-
pants. The increasing importance of electronic com-
merce emphasizes the need to carry this
type of research analysis to electronic mar-
ketplaces. It is unclear who the beneficia-
ries of this process will be. The ability to
implement different price discovery mech-
anisms may result in more efficient mar-
kets, thus benefiting buyers and hurting
inefficient sellers. As menu costs decrease,
sellers will move away from fixed pricing,
and more prices will become negotiable
[7]. While savvy buyers may benefit, the
ability to negotiate prices may not be
pleasant or result in a good deal, as many
visitors to auto dealerships have discov-
ered. Furthermore, when sellers are better informed,
they are likely to increase their profits by charging
different prices to different buyers. Economic theory
predicts that buyers with more bargaining power,
typically the more affluent ones, will fare better in
this situation.  
Facilitation. The cost of logistics—the process of
transporting products from the seller to the buyer—
has been estimated at more than 10% of the GNP
[8]. Electronic marketplaces improve information
sharing between buyers and sellers, helping lower
the cost of logistics and promoting quick, just-in-
time deliveries and reduced inventories. The distrib-
ution of information goods such as newspapers,
music, videos and software, is likely to be com-
pletely transformed, as the information infrastruc-
ture will replace physical distribution systems.
Sellers in Internet marketplaces are typically respon-
sible for delivery to their customers, and increasingly
contract with third-party providers for direct deliv-
ery from the manufacturer to the final consumer,
reducing costs and time-to-delivery. Thus, direct
sellers like Dell Computer are squeezing out tradi-
tional intermediaries such as wholesalers and dis-
tributors, while delivery providers such as FedEx and
UPS are emerging as major Internet intermediaries,
because of their logistics expertise and their
economies of scale in distribution.
Electronic payment systems will further lower
transaction costs in Internet marketplaces, and
micropayment systems will lower the cost of small
transactions, enabling new pricing strategies such as
the metering of software use. As face-to-face market-
places are replaced by electronic ones, there is
increasing need to protect market participants from
opportunistic behavior. Technologies such as public
key cryptography can provide security and authenti-
cation of transactions, while intermediaries like
Bizrate (www.bizrate.com) will use information
from consumers to keep track of merchants’ reputa-
tions. Credit bureaus and credit card companies will
provide credit information or guarantee payment for
consumers. Finally, intermediaries like Verisign
(www.verisign.com) are emerging as “certificate
authorities” that match legal identities to the pos-
session of cryptographic keys—a public key infra-
structure.
Internet Marketplaces and Competition
Impact of Lower Search Costs. The ability of Inter-
net marketplaces to reduce search costs for price and
product information may significantly affect compe-
tition. Bakos [4, 5] shows that lower buyer search
costs in electronic marketplaces promote price com-
petition among sellers. This effect will be most dra-
matic in commodity markets, where intensive price
competition can eliminate all seller profits. It will
also be significant in markets where products are dif-
ferentiated, reducing the monopoly power enjoyed
by sellers, and leading to lower prices and seller prof-
its. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium prices for a dif-
ferentiated good with zero marginal cost, which
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As search costs fall from very high to
moderate, new markets emerge, and
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However, if search costs continue to fall,
market prices fall and sellers are made
worse off, while buyers benefit from the
lower prices and their improved ability
to find products that fit their needs.
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Figure 3. The impact of buyer search costs in a differentiated
market
consumers value at r and has a degree of differentia-
tion t. As search costs fall from very high to moder-
ate, new markets emerge, and both sellers and buyers
benefit.  However, if search costs continue to fall,
sellers are made worse off since buyers can more eas-
ily find the lowest-cost seller, while buyers benefit
from the lower prices and their improved ability to
find products that fit their needs.
The dynamics of friction-free markets are not
attractive for sellers that had previously depended on
geography or customer ignorance to insulate them
from the low-cost sellers in the market. As geogra-
phy becomes less important, new sources of product
differentiation, such as customized features or service
or innovation, will become more important, at least
for those sellers who don’t have the lowest cost of
production. Also, like an arms race in which both
sides develop increasingly powerful weapons, sellers
can exploit the reduction in menu costs to compen-
sate for the lower search costs in electronic market-
places. Specifically, sellers can make it difficult to
compare the price of alternative product offerings,
and they can attempt to collect information about
buyers that allows more effective price discrimina-
tion. Airlines, for example, have implemented
extremely complicated and ever-changing fare struc-
tures, flight restrictions, and ticket availability,
sometimes offering hundreds of fares for travel
between certain pairs of destinations.
It is also interesting to note that when informa-
tional inefficiencies prevail, a large number of sellers
does not necessarily result in a competitive and effi-
cient market. If search costs are high, individual sell-
ers do not have a strong incentive to lower their
prices because few buyers would discover them. As
the number of sellers increases, it becomes more dif-
ficult for buyers to locate discounters, and thus the
market may become more monopolistic as the num-
ber of sellers increases! This behavior is likely in cer-
tain markets with little or no advertising, such as
some markets for professional legal and medical ser-
vices. Internet marketplaces could provide price cut-
ters with the means to reach a larger fraction of the
buyers, and thus undermine the monopolistic nature
of these markets.
While there is much speculation about the effect
that electronic marketplaces have on prices, thus far
there has been little systematic analysis. One
exploratory study by Bailey and Brynjolfsson [3] did
not find much evidence that prices on the Internet
were lower than prices for the same goods sold via
traditional retail channels. Their analysis was based
on data from 52 Internet and conventional retailers
for 337 distinct titles of books, music compact discs,
and software. Bailey and Brynjolfsson provide several
possible explanations for their unexpected findings,
including the possibility that searching on the Inter-
net during the sample period was not as easy as is
sometimes assumed, that the demographics of the
typical Internet user encouraged a higher price equi-
librium, that many of the Internet retailers were still
experimenting with pricing strategies, and that
Internet retailers were differentiating their products
(for example, via delivery options or customized rec-
ommendations). Clearly, more empirical research is
needed in this area.
Increasing Differentiation and Lowering the
Cost of Product Information. A higher degree of
product differentiation leads to an increase in seller
profits, which may partially or completely offset the
decrease caused by lower search costs. Sellers in elec-
tronic markets will thus want increasingly to differ-
entiate their products, possibly utilizing the
personalization and customization technologies dis-
cussed earlier.
Buyers in a differentiated market face two types of
search costs: the cost of obtaining price information
and the cost of obtaining information about the
product characteristics of a seller’s offering. If sellers
can control the type of electronic market introduced,
they should favor a system emphasizing product
information rather than price-shopping. 
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The dynamics of friction-free markets are not attractive for sellers 
that had previously depended on geography or customer ignorance to 
insulate them from the low-cost sellers in the market. 
A key variable for such a system is the cost of
product information relative to the cost of price
information about the product. For instance, an
electronic marketplace designed to promote price-
shopping makes it easy to compare price informa-
tion, but might still require a higher-cost inquiry
(such as a visit) to obtain detailed product informa-
tion. For example, a buyer looking for a computer
monitor on the Internet can easily compare prices
from a large number of sellers, but then must obtain
and evaluate the monitors’ specifications, assess the
sellers’ reputations and return policies, and ideally
locate a display model at a showroom or at a col-
league’s office.
By contrast, an electronic marketplace can be
designed to promote competition based on product
features. For example, high-quality multimedia
product descriptions in standardized formats could
help identify product offerings matching the buy-
er’s preferences, while price information could be
left out of these descriptions or could be obscured
by offering a large number of prices and making it
difficult for the buyers to figure out which price
actually applies. 
The Role of Electronic Intermediaries
It has been argued that as friction-free electronic
marketplaces lower the cost of market transac-
tions, it will become easy to match directly buyers
and sellers, and as a result, the role of intermedi-
aries may be reduced or even eliminated leading to
“disintermediation” (see [9, 10]). While the
growth of Internet marketplaces may lead certain
types of intermediaries to extinction, the discus-
sion in the previous sections suggests that elec-
tronic marketplaces will more than compensate for
this by promoting the growth of new types of elec-
tronic intermediaries. These intermediaries will
perform functions that include matching buyers
and sellers, providing product information to buy-
ers and marketing information to sellers, aggre-
gating information goods, integrating the
components of consumer processes, managing
physical deliveries and payments, providing trust
relationships and ensuring the integrity of the
markets.
Presently, Internet-based electronic intermedi-
aries often “freeload” on traditional intermediaries
for various reasons, such as the physical experience
that is still important in several markets before a
buyer can select an appropriate product offering. For
example, car buyers may test drive a vehicle at a tra-
ditional dealer, and subsequently purchase it
through Auto-by-Tel. This clearly cannot be sus-
tained as electronic intermediaries gain a significant
market share. Instead, the physical experience com-
ponent might be unbundled to a physical interme-
diary. Auto-by-Tel, for example, may pay a fee to the
intermediary where the test drive took place, a ser-
vice that could be provided by a traditional dealer-
ship, but also by a specialized showroom or a car
rental company.
Internet-based electronic marketplaces are still at
a formative stage, and it is hard to fully predict their
impact on the structure of markets. However it is
becoming clear that they will promote greater eco-
nomic efficiency, and help sustain economic growth.
In the process, they are creating major transforma-
tions, full of strategic opportunities for intermedi-
aries ready to compete by adding value for buyers
and sellers rather than by exploiting information
asymmetries.
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